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I. Introduction
Do states violate the dormant commerce clause when
they exempt from tax their own bonds but not bonds
from other states? The Supreme Court will resolve that
question next term in Davis v. Kentucky.1 The Court
granted certiorari to review a decision of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, which held unconstitutional the por-
tion of the Kentucky income tax code that grants an
exclusion for in-state, but not out-of-state, municipal
bond interest.2 The Kentucky decision conflicts with
Sharper v. Tracy, a decision by the Ohio intermediate
appeals court that discriminatory taxation of out-of-state
municipal bonds was constitutionally permissible.3
To see how a typical state income tax exclusion for
municipal bond4 interest works, consider the Kentucky
statute at issue in Davis. Like most state income tax laws,
the Kentucky income tax is conformed to the federal
income tax. The starting point for computing Kentucky
taxable income is ‘‘gross income’’ as defined by section
61. Section 104 excludes from income interest earned on
municipal bonds. When computing Kentucky taxable
income, Kentucky residents are required to add back to
their federal gross income revenue earned on municipal
bonds not issued by the state of Kentucky or one of its
political subdivisions.5 The Kentucky and North Carolina
1197 S.W. 3d 557 (Ky. App. 2006), cert. granted, May 21, 2007
(No. 06-666), Doc 2007-1719, 2007 TNT 17-13.
2The Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
3Sharper v. Tracy, 647 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
4We use the term ‘‘municipal bond’’ to denote all bonds
eligible for preferential treatment by federal or state tax laws,
whether issued by states or their political subdivisions.
5Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 141.010(10)(c).
Ethan Yale is an associate professor at George-
town University Law Center. He can be contacted at
edy@law.georgetown.edu.
Brian Galle is an assistant professor at the Florida
State University College of Law. He can be contacted
at bgalle@law.fsu.edu.
This report considers the constitutionality of the
common state practice of exempting interest on the
state’s own municipal bonds from taxation but
imposing tax on municipal bonds issued in other
states. The authors weigh the effect of a recent
Supreme Court decision, United Haulers, on chal-
lenges to those statutes, including one suit, Davis v.
Kentucky, in which a petition for certiorari was
recently granted. The authors say the Court held
that a municipal ordinance didn’t violate the
dormant commerce clause because the ordinance
operated as a preference for a government-owned
facility. United Haulers might save from constitu-
tional invalidity state tax laws favoring in-state
municipal bonds, but the authors doubt it. Although
United Haulers lifts the presumption of unconstitu-
tionality from laws favoring state-run businesses in
competition with private business, the authors argue
that the Court should remain skeptical of discrimi-
natory laws that shield state officials from the
pressure of competition with activities undertaken
by other states. They predict that, if constitutional
law remains as it stands, state laws exempting only
in-state municipal bonds will be found to violate the
dormant commerce clause. But they conclude that if
they are wrong and state tax laws favoring in-state
municipal bonds are shielded by United Haulers, it
will mark a significant extension of the nascent
state-run business exception to the dormant com-
merce clause.
The authors would like to thank Edward Hines,
Gregg Polsky, and Mark Tushnet for their helpful
comments and suggestions.
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laws currently being challenged and the Ohio law vali-
dated by the Sharper court are essentially the same.
Those three states are not alone. In all, 43 states have
tax laws that discriminate against out-of-state bonds.6 Of
those, 38 states impose income tax on interest earned on
out-of-state municipal bonds, while exempting from tax
interest earned on all in-state municipal bonds. Four
more states have tax laws that exempt interest on some
(not all) in-state bonds but impose tax on all out-of-state
municipal bonds. Of the remaining eight states, six don’t
impose an income tax (so the issue doesn’t arise). The last
two states are Utah and Indiana. Utah has a discrimina-
tory law like Kentucky’s, but the discriminatory treat-
ment of out-of-state bonds does not apply for bonds
issued by states that don’t tax interest on Utah bonds.7
Indiana has the only nondiscriminatory tax rule in the
nation: It exempts all interest on bonds issued by states
and their political subdivisions.
The municipal bond market is huge. Between 1996
and 2002, state and local governments issued approxi-
mately $2.1 trillion of tax-exempt bonds.8 Interstate in-
vestment in the municipal bond market is profoundly
affected by the discriminatory tax provisions restricting
state income tax exclusions to in-state bonds. According
to the municipal bond research firm Municipal Market
Advisors, at the end of 2005, 13 percent of all outstanding
municipal bonds were held by state-specific mutual
funds.9 All of the mutual fund companies caution that
state-specific municipal bond funds are appropriate only
for residents of that state10 because out-of-state buyers
would not benefit from the state tax exemption and
would squander the benefits of diversification. Morning-
star, the mutual fund investment advisory, offers its
readers the following advice:
Know Your State’s Tax Rate. Some municipal-bond
funds invest all over the country, while others focus
on a single state. National funds offer geographical
diversification and can seize opportunities from
New York to New Mexico. Single-state funds,
meanwhile, provide residents with income that’s
exempt from both federal and state taxes. (National
muni funds give you only the federal tax break.) A
Californian doesn’t pay the 9.3% state income tax
on the income from a California muni fund, and a
resident of the Bay State avoids the 5.95% Massa-
chusetts tax on income from a Massachusetts fund.
Choose a single-state fund if you live in a high-tax
state. Otherwise, go national for the diversification
benefits.11
There is no doubt that investors who buy individual
offerings of municipal bonds, rather than bond funds, are
influenced greatly by the in-state-only interest tax ex-
emption. The Bond Market Association, for instance, has
compiled on its Web site the state income tax brackets for
the 43 states that have discriminatory income tax exemp-
tions,12 to make it easy for investors to consider state
income tax consequences when considering a municipal
bond investment.13
Predicting how the Court will resolve this issue is
complicated, more so now in the wake of the Court’s
recent decision in United Haulers Association, Inc. v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority.14 In
United Haulers the Court held that a municipal trash flow
control ordinance didn’t violate the dormant commerce
clause because, although it granted a monopoly to a local
trash processing facility to the exclusion of private trash
processing facilities in other states, the ordinance wasn’t
‘‘discriminatory.’’ The Court found that the private trash
processing facilities with which the Oneida-Herkimer
municipal trash facility would compete absent the chal-
lenged law weren’t ‘‘similarly situated.’’15 In particular,
the Court held, publicly owned facilities are not similarly
situated with those that are privately held.
One could read United Haulers to establish a new
exception to the dormant commerce clause whereby
states and their political subdivisions are permitted to
favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state rivals
as long as the state or municipal government owned some
commercial operation in that market. The new exception
is potentially broader than the existing ‘‘market partici-
pation’’ exception16 in that it shields regulatory rather
than just participatory market incursions; and it could
shield states from claims like the one in Davis.
We argue below, however, that United Haulers doesn’t
necessarily determine the outcome of Davis. If the Court
rules in Kentucky’s favor in reliance on the principle laid
down in United Haulers, it will be a significant extension
of what we term the nascent ‘‘state-run business’’ excep-
tion to the dormant commerce clause propagated by
United Haulers.
We proceed as follows. After reviewing the nondis-
crimination principle embodied in recent Supreme Court
opinions applicable to state income tax laws, we address
possible defenses that might vindicate state laws like the6In a related context, Prof. Walter Hellerstein has remarked
on his ‘‘instinctive sense’’ that any practice so widespread
‘‘cannot really be unconstitutional.’’ Jerome R. Hellerstein and
Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation, par. 4.13[2][b][v], at 4-88 (3d
ed. 2000) (commenting on tax credits and business subsidies
favoring private businesses).
7See Petition for Cert. 7-8, Kentucky v. Davis, No. 06-666, filed
Nov. 9. 2006.
8See Cynthia Belmonte, ‘‘Tax-Exempt Bonds, 1996-2002,’’ at
151 (SOI Bulletin Summer 2005), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02govbnd.pdf.
9Municipal Market Advisors, ‘‘Weekly Outlook,’’ Oct. 23,











14550 U.S. ___ (2007) (Slip Op. Apr. 30, 2007) (No. 05-1345).
15Id. at 11 (quoting General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 313
(1997), Doc 97-4863, 97 TNT 33-16 (Scalia, J. concurring)).
16We describe the market participant exception in more
detail below. See infra notes 32-34.
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one at issue in Davis. We consider but ultimately reject
the idea that the market participation doctrine could save
discriminatory state tax laws from invalidity, and then
assess the importance of United Haulers. We think United
Haulers makes the question whether the Supreme Court
will validate preference for in-state municipal bonds
closer and more difficult than it was previously, but
ultimately conclude that the taxpayer should prevail in
Davis. Along the way we situate United Haulers in the
constellation of Supreme Court dormant commerce
clause cases, and offer predictions and suggestions re-
garding the appropriate scope of the nascent state-run
business exception to the dormant commerce clause.
II. The Nondiscrimination Principle
A basic rule that springs from contemporary Supreme
Court cases is that a state tax rule discriminating in favor
of in-state activities is presumptively unconstitutional.17
A rule is discriminatory if a taxpayer’s effective tax rate
increases when the taxpayer conducts economic activity
out of state compared with what the effective tax rate
would have been had the taxpayer engaged in the same
activity in-state.18
The Court has applied that rule with a fair degree of
consistency; constitutionality has generally not turned on
the specific tax mechanism that creates the bias against
interstate commerce. Exclusions, credits, deductions, and
special modifications to the rate of tax have all been
found unconstitutional.19 Indeed, since its landmark
Complete Auto decision in 1977, the Court has never
upheld a tax it deemed to be discriminatory.
The first case in this line is Boston Stock Exchange
(1977), in which the Court invalidated a New York state
stock transfer tax.20 The stock transfer tax applied when
any one of five events occurred in New York, including
sale or transfer. The challenged provisions of the tax
afforded a 50 percent reduction in the tax rate when a sale
by a nonresident took place in New York and limited to
$350 the total tax liability (for both residents and nonresi-
dents) for sales that took place in New York.
Thus if a sale by a non-New Yorker took place on the
Boston Stock Exchange but the shares were transferred in
New York, the tax rate would be twice what it would
have been had the sale taken place on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE); or, if the sale in Boston attracted
a New York transfer tax of more than $350, regardless of
the residency of the seller, the $350 cap wouldn’t apply
like it would have if the sale had taken place on the
NYSE. The Court observed that therefore:
the choice of exchange by all non-residents and by
residents engaging in large transaction is not made
solely on the basis of nontax criteria. . . . The obvi-
ous effect of the tax is to extend a financial advan-
tage to sales on the New York exchanges at the
expense of regional exchanges. [The tax] forecloses
tax neutral decisions and creates both an advantage
for the exchanges in New York and a discrimina-
tory burden on commerce to its sister States.21
The Court held that it is constitutionally impermis-
sible either to encourage nonresidents to engage in com-
merce with the state or to discourage residents to engage
in commerce outside of the state.
The next case was Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Diaz (1984),
in which the Court invalidated a Hawaii excise tax
imposed on liquors at wholesale on the ground that the
tax included an exemption for okolehao — a brandy
distilled from the root of an indigenous Hawaiian shrub
— and pineapple wine.22 The Supreme Court, following
the Supreme Court of Hawaii, found that the Legisla-
ture’s motivation for exempting the local products from
the tax was to promote local industry. Citing Boston Stock
Exchange, the Court explained that it is impermissible to
‘‘tax interstate transactions in order to favor local busi-
nesses over out-of-state businesses’’ because ‘‘the Com-
merce Clause limits the manner in which States may
legitimately compete for interstate trade.’’23
In New Energy Co. v. Limbach (1988), a unanimous
Court invalidated an Ohio motor vehicle fuel tax that
offered a credit to fuel dealers who sold fuel that con-
tained ethanol produced in Ohio, but no similar credit for
fuel that contained ethanol produced in other states
(unless the state in which the fuel was produced offered
a credit for ethanol produced in Ohio).24 The result in
New Energy Co. seems in hindsight to have been utterly
predictable, particularly after Boston Stock Exchange and
Bacchus.
In Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner (1996), the Court invalidated
a North Carolina intangibles tax that allowed resident
17Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
18A tax fitting that description might be constitutional if, for
example, the measure is found to impose a compensatory
burden, the effect of which is to make interstate commerce bear
a burden borne by intrastate commerce (a use tax being the
classic example), Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577
(1937), or if the in-state and out-of-state activities being com-
pared are found not to be comparable. General Motors Corp. v.
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
19However, there are some state tax arrangements, most
notably those relating to the division, or ‘‘apportionment,’’ of
income from a multistate entity, that in effect permit discrimi-
nation but for complicated reasons have escaped any real
scrutiny. See Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267
(1978); Hellerstein and Hellerstein, supra note 6, par. 8.13[2][a],
at 8-225 to 8-226, par. 8.13[2][b], at 8-229 to 8-235.
20429 U.S. 318 (1977). Of course there are much older cases
invalidating discriminatory taxes, but given the convoluted
history of Supreme Court dormant commerce clause tax cases, it
makes sense to begin in the year the Court handed down
Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), when the
modern era began.
21429 U.S. at 331.
22468 U.S. 263 (1984).
23Id. at 272. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388
(1984), decided the same year as Bacchus, invalidated a New
York franchise tax credit scheme that provided a bigger credit
the more export shipping activity was conducted in New York.
The Court found it irrelevant that the law operated by disal-
lowing an otherwise allowable credit rather than by imposing a
higher tax, because the practical effect of both would be the
same: increasing the effective tax rate when the taxpayer does
more business out-of-state.
24486 U.S. 269 (1988).
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shareholders a credit equal to the fraction of the issuing
corporation’s income subject to North Carolina’s corpo-
rate income tax.25 If the issuing corporation did all of its
business in North Carolina (so all of its income was
subject to the North Carolina corporate income tax), the
credit would eliminate the intangibles tax completely; if
the issuing corporation did no business in North Carolina
(so none of its income was subject to the North Carolina
corporate income tax), no credit would be available; and
in intermediate cases in which the corporation did some
business inside and some outside of North Carolina,
North Carolina shareholders would get a partial credit.26
The effect of the tax was to increase the rate of tax in
proportion to the fraction of business conducted out of
state. Thus, like the tax at issue in Boston Stock Exchange,
the tax foreclosed tax-neutral decision-making: North
Carolina residents would find their tax burdens reduced
when they chose to invest in corporations with more
significant North Carolina operations, and corporations
with shareholders in North Carolina could reduce their
shareholders’ tax bills by increasing property owned,
employees, or sales within North Carolina relative to the
total in each category.
Most recently, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of
Harrison (1997), the Court invalidated a Maine municipal
property tax that included an exemption for property
owned by charitable institutions provided the charitable
institution is operated principally for the benefit of
residents.27 Charities like the petitioner’s summer camp
that operated primarily for the benefit of nonresidents,
were taxed in full.28 The opinion reinforces the familiar
free trade theme that permeates all of the discriminatory
tax decisions and comfortably fits within the rule that
when states increase a taxpayer’s effective tax rate for
participating in interstate rather than purely intrastate
commerce — here admitting campers primarily from
other states — the rule creating the bias favoring intra-
state commerce is unconstitutional.
Under the standard set out by these cases, a state’s
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state munici-
pal bonds would plainly be unconstitutional. As in Boston
Stock Exchange and Fulton Corp., the differential tax
‘‘forecloses tax neutral decisions’’ by imposing additional
state tax on municipal bonds issued outside of the state.
Indeed, in many respects those statutes appear almost
identical to the Ohio credit scheme invalidated in New
Energy: The state offers a tax discount to purchasers who
acquire items produced and purchased inside the state.
III. Defenses for Discriminatory Regulation
Against that backdrop, the case favoring constitution-
ality for tax provisions favoring in-state municipal bonds
appears thin. There are, however, at least two distinct
arguments that states could advance to overcome the
weight of Boston Stock Exchange and its progeny: (1) the
market participation exception to the dormant commerce
clause, and (2) an argument that discrimination favoring
state-run operations (particularly those that can be clas-
sified as ‘‘traditional’’) is subject to far less-exacting
constitutional scrutiny than discrimination favoring in-
state business.
The first argument is weak. Until the Supreme Court
announced its decision in United Haulers,29 the second
argument also seemed quite weak, based on the reason-
ing of the Court’s opinion in C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown.30 However, in the wake of United Haulers,
initial reports suggest it now seems likely that Ken-
tucky’s statute, and other state tax laws favoring in-state
municipal bonds, will survive constitutional attack.31
We first explain why the market participation doctrine
won’t shield state income tax preferences for in-state
municipal bonds, and then assess the fledgling doctrine
that regulation (possibly including tax laws) that favors
state or local government is effectively exempted from
the dormant commerce clause.
A. The Market Participation Doctrine
The Court has upheld blatant discrimination by states
in favor of in-state businesses when the state buys
printing services, sells cement, purchases abandoned
vehicles, or hires workers.32 That rule, referred to as the
market participation doctrine, is an exception to the
normal rule of ‘‘virtual per se invalidity’’ for facially
discriminatory regulation.33 The rationale underlying the
rule is that states, just like private merchants, should be
free to choose their trading partners.34
Note, however, that this exception extends only as far
as the concept of a market ‘‘participant’’ can take it. By its
25516 U.S. 325 (1996), Doc 96-5316, 96 TNT 37-22.
26For example, if IBM did 5 percent of its business in North
Carolina in a given year, the effect of the allowable 5 percent
credit would be that a North Carolina shareholder would pay
intangibles tax on 95 percent of the value of her shares.
27520 U.S. 564 (1997), Doc 97-13802, 97 TNT 97-25.
28Charities that operated for the principal benefit of nonresi-
dents could still enjoy a partial exemption if they did not charge
more than $30 per year for their services, which was not true for
the petitioner. Id. at 568 n.2.
29Supra note 14.
30511 U.S. 383 (1994).
31See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman and Peter Schroeder, ‘‘High
Court to Hear Davis Case,’’ The Bond Buyer, May 22, 2007,
available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/article.html? id=2007
0521Q82KJOW0&from=home (citing views of bond industry
legal experts).
32American Yearbook Co. v. Sakew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.
1972), affd. mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1973) (printing services); Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (cement); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 429 U.S. 794 (1976) (‘‘hulks,’’ that is, abandoned
cars); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460
U.S. 204 (1983) (hiring workers).
33See Hellerstein and Hellerstein, supra note 6, at para.
4.13[1][a], p. 4-71 and n.302 (collecting citations to cases using
the ‘‘virtual per se rule’’ formulation).
34Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439 and n.12 (citing United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)). Academics have argued that
the doctrine is undertheorized and have offered a variety of
rationales for the market participation doctrine. The most
complete summary and critique is Dan T. Coenen, ‘‘Untangling
the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce
Clause,’’ 88 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1989).
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logic, the market participation exception should permit
states to discriminate only to the extent that they are
acting as an ‘‘ordinary’’ participant in the market would
or could.35 That is, if a state is free to discriminate in the
ways a private actor could, the state’s mere participation
in the market would not necessarily license the state to
further control or regulate the market. For instance,
purchasers (aside from monopsonists) don’t set prices.
Therefore, a state’s decision to acquire, say, cement,
would not also empower it to regulate cement prices in a
way that contravened the dormant commerce clause.
Thus, the inherent difficulty with that rule is determining
when the state is acting as market participant and when
it is acting as regulator.36
In Davis, the state’s argument would be that it is acting
as financier, much as private businesses do whenever
they sell bonds. But the tax laws exempting in-state but
not out-of-state municipal bond interest are a feature of
the Kentucky tax code, not a feature of the municipal
bonds themselves. Other market participants, however
defined, do not have the power to determine the taxable
status of their rival’s bonds. The state has not merely
entered the market, but also stacked the market in its
own favor. Or, put another way, the state enters the debt
market twice — once as a participant when it sells bonds
and once as a regulator when it specifies the tax treat-
ment of the bonds it has (and other states have) sold.
The state might also argue that those interventions in
the market should be grouped together and that they
denoted participation, rather than regulation. In support
of that argument, a state might point out that it could
have achieved an economically identical outcome by
modifying the terms of its bonds so they paid higher
interest to holders subject to income taxation in the
issuing state than to other holders. That is, the state could
frame its policy as a simple ‘‘market’’ choice to borrow on
terms more generous to the lender when the lender pays
state tax than otherwise. Because the substance of the
state’s treatment of municipal bonds, taken as a whole, is
the same as the state could have achieved through a
purely participatory intervention in the market, none of
its activities should be classified as ‘‘regulatory.’’37
That argument is foreclosed by precedent. In New
Energy, the Court rejected an invitation to apply the
market participant doctrine. As described above, the
challenged law in New Energy was an Ohio state tax
credit against state fuel sales tax for fuels that incorpo-
rated Ohio-produced ethanol. The court quickly brushed
aside the claim that Ohio was participating in the ethanol
market as either a purchaser or a seller, finding it obvious
that assessment and computation of taxes is a regulatory
function.38
In Camps Newfound, the town argued that through the
challenged property tax exemption the town was pur-
chasing the services of the charitable institutions that
qualified for the exemption (recall that to qualify for the
tax exemption, a specified share of the charity’s benefi-
ciaries had to be state residents).39 The Court acknowl-
edged that many tax provisions are designed to function
as subsidies to local industries, but concluded that that
fact doesn’t transform the tax law into market participa-
tion; the Court explained that nothing short of direct state
participation in the market would suffice.40 The plurality
opinion in South Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke is to the
same effect, as described elsewhere.41
There are difficult cases in which classifying the
government’s activity as market participation or regula-
tion is ambiguous, but Davis isn’t one of them.42 Taxation
is a ‘‘regulatory’’ function, not one performed by market
participants. And although there might be economically
equivalent transactions that would make the state a
‘‘direct’’ seller of higher-rate bonds to its taxpayers, the
form states have chosen does not.43 Thus, the Court
couldn’t plausibly conclude that exemption for munici-
pal bond interest was market participation instead of
regulation without overruling or at least severely limiting
New Energy and Camps Newfound.
B. The Nascent State-Run Businesses Exception
Until recently, then, the prospect that states could
constitutionally exempt only their own bonds from taxa-
tion appeared quite dim.44 The scene may have bright-
ened considerably with the Supreme Court’s recent de-
cision in United Haulers. United Haulers appears to
35See United Haulers Assoc., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 438 F.3d 150, 157-158 (2d Cir. 2006).
36An obvious point of contention, one not so far squarely
confronted by the Court, is how one should define ‘‘partici-
pant.’’ See infra note 40.
37This argument would be more tenuous for bonds not
issued by the state itself but rather by municipalities or other
state subdivisions. In those instances, the state could not plau-
sibly claim that through its income tax law it was simply
changing the terms on which it deals with its own lenders.
However, favorable treatment for bonds issued by state subdi-
visions could still be envisioned as the equivalent of a cash
subsidy.
38Id. at 277 (‘‘assessment and computation of taxes [is] a
primeval governmental activity’’).
39Respondent’s Brief at 34, New Energy (No. 87-654) (‘‘The
expenditures which exemptions for charities represent can be
viewed as ‘purchases’ of services through a tax exemption.’’).
40520 U.S. at 593. Unfortunately, distinguishing direct from
indirect market participation isn’t easy. Compare South Central
Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (applying market
participation doctrine when the state imposed a requirement
through contract on its counterparty in which the requirement
was inherently regulatory), with White v. Mass. Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (refusing to apply the
doctrine in the same circumstance).
41See Coenen, supra note 34, at 403.
42For close cases, see supra note 40.
43Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, ‘‘On Tariffs v. Subsidies in
Interstate Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis,’’ 74 Wash. U.
L.Q. 1127, 1141 (1996) (arguing that in the Court’s application of
the market participant doctrine, ‘‘the economic effect of the
state . . . program is not material to the analysis; instead, all that
matter[s] [i]s the form’’).
44The potential constitutional infirmity of taxing out-of-state
but not in-state municipal bonds could be corrected either by
imposing state income tax on all municipal bonds or on none of
them. If the Court rules for the taxpayer in Davis, we would
expect different states to make different prospective policy deci-
sions regarding how to proceed. Retrospectively, however, the
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT
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announce a rule providing that state regulations in favor
of a government-run enterprise will be subject only to
mild scrutiny. That suggests, in turn, that a state tax
regime favoring bonds issued by state and local govern-
ment need clear only a relatively low constitutional
hurdle. As we will explain, however, we believe that
ultimately United Haulers is distinguishable from the
municipal bond case and therefore that it too will not
provide shelter for differential taxation of in-state and
out-of-state municipal bonds.
1. United Haulers. United Haulers continues a long tradi-
tion of Supreme Court dormant commerce clause trash
cases. Most notable among those antecedents was the
Court’s 1994 decision in Carbone, which invalidated a
local town ordinance granting a select local facility ex-
clusive rights to collect, for a fee, all trash in the town.45
In exchange, the putative owner of the facility granted
the town an option to acquire the trash facility for $1 after
the facility had been in operation for five years. In effect,
the town had built its own facility, with title nominally
held by a private firm, and had financed it by granting
monopoly profits to the private builder.46 The Court
struck down the ordinance, holding that it discriminated
against interstate commerce and therefore was defensible
only ‘‘under rigorous scrutiny.’’47 The Court found that
the town’s ordinance failed that scrutiny because other
financing alternatives were available.48
United Haulers presented almost identical facts to
Carbone but reached the opposite conclusion. As the
Court noted, ‘‘the only salient difference is that the laws
at issue [in United Haulers] require haulers to bring waste
to facilities owned and operated by a state-created public
benefit corporation’’ — that is, a nominally public rather
than private entity.49 That difference proved significant.
After noting that ‘‘discrimination assumes a comparison
of substantially similar entities,’’ the Court found that a
public trash facility is not substantially similar to com-
peting private trash facilities and that therefore the
‘‘rigorous scrutiny’’ of Carbone did not apply.50 It then (in
a section of the opinion garnering only four votes)
upheld the trash flow ordinance under a less exacting
balancing test.
The Court justified that result by pointing to the
underlying purposes of the commerce clause. In particu-
lar, the Court claimed that public ownership of the
privileged facility (present in United Haulers, but absent
in Carbone, at least formally) was significant because the
evidentiary inferences that flow from discrimination in
favor of public entities differ from those that would arise
in the case of discrimination in favor of private business.
The latter, the Court claimed, justifies rigorous scrutiny
because it often is the result of ‘‘simple economic protec-
tionism,’’ while discrimination in favor of government
might result from many other purposes.51 When local
government likely acts for reason other than simple
protectionism, the balance between local autonomy and
the need to protect free trade swings in favor of local
autonomy. Thus, although laws favoring government
business are in a literal sense discriminatory, they may
not constitute ‘‘discrimination’’ in the Court’s technical
usage.52
United Haulers has fairly obvious implications for
Davis and other cases presenting the same issue. Like the
ordinance granting the townships a monopoly in United
Haulers, state tax laws imposing tax only on out-of-state
municipal bonds are ‘‘laws favoring local government.’’
They therefore should have to meet only the relatively
forgiving balancing test for ‘‘legitimate local concerns
with effects upon interstate commerce that are only
incidental.’’53 Importantly, however, Chief Justice Roberts
was able to gather only three other votes for the propo-
sition that revenue generation can be a proper purpose
that might justify state regulation with incidental effects
on commerce. Carbone held that ‘‘revenue generation is
not a local interest that can justify discrimination against
interstate commerce.’’54 It is possible, therefore, that
revenue raising will also be an invalid consideration in
support of nondiscriminatory laws having an incidental
effect on interstate commerce, such that states will have
to point to some reason other than revenue for denying
an exemption for out-of-state municipal bonds.55
2. Distinguishing Davis from United Haulers. Despite
the similarities, we think that in the end, United Haulers is
distinguishable from the case of differential taxation of
in-state and out-of-state municipal bonds. Most signifi-
cantly, while both Davis and United Haulers involve
‘‘discrimination’’ (in the nontechnical sense) in favor of a
local government project, the municipal bond scenario
states would be required to issue refunds to taxpayers holding
out-of-state bonds. See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Bever-
ages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990); Walter Hellerstein and Dan
T. Coenen, ‘‘Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business
Development Incentives,’’ 81 Cornell L. Rev. 789, 873 (1996)
(noting that although the McKesson Court held open the possi-
bility of retroactively repealing the favored treatment for those
privileged by the invalidated tax provision, practical, political,
and legal difficulties would make that course of action exceed-
ingly unlikely).




49United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., No. 05-1345 (Apr. 30, 2007), slip op. at 1.
50Id. at 10-13.
51Id. at 11.
52We elaborate on the technical usage of the term ‘‘discrimi-
nation’’ below. See text accompanying notes 57-60 infra.
53United Haulers, slip op. at 14.
54Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.
55It is worth emphasizing that the policy that states will have
to justify is not exemption for their own bonds, but rather the
denial of exemption for municipal bonds originating in other
states. For example, in United Haulers, the Court demanded
justifications, not for the existence of the trash facility, but rather
specifically for the challenged ordinance granting exclusive
hauling rights to the public facility operators. Ultimately, the
towns were able to link the two by arguing successfully that the
trash facility likely could not succeed without the grant of the
monopoly right. But we see no similar argument linking dis-
crimination against out-of-state bonds to the need for tax-
exempt bonds generally.
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discriminates against a different set of actors. While the
ordinance at issue in United Haulers discriminated against
all trash haulers, whether local or out of state, the state
municipal bond provisions discriminate only against out-
of-state issuers of municipal bonds, which are themselves
public entities. As a result, there is a stronger argument
that the favored and disfavored groups are ‘‘similarly
situated.’’ We explain the significance of that point mo-
mentarily. Perhaps more importantly, the absence of
private in-state competitors issuing municipal bonds
suggests that there are only minimal political checks on
the state’s decision to distort the interstate market for
capital.
a. The public-private distinction. The outcome of
United Haulers turns on the ‘‘public’’ character of the
project favored by the monopoly right challenged there.
As we have explained, the Court relied on the fact that
the trash facility was government-owned to draw an
inference that the ordinance was not ‘‘simple economic
protectionism.’’ Also, the fact that the facility was public
played a role in the Court’s formal doctrinal analysis.
Again, that was the only distinction of any substance
between United Haulers and Carbone.56 The Court was
able to distinguish Carbone, without abrogating it out-
right, by claiming that ‘‘any notion of discrimination
assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities.’’57
It then asserted, in essence, that public entities are not
substantially similar to private entities and therefore that
the ordinance at issue in United Haulers did not ‘‘discrimi-
nate.’’
If we take that syllogism at face value, the taxation of
municipal bonds would seem clearly distinguishable
from United Haulers. State income tax provisions impos-
ing tax on municipal bonds issued by government enti-
ties outside the taxing state benefit in-state municipal
bond issuers at the cost, not of private entities, but rather
of other governments. Thus, those tax provisions treat
differently two entities that are identical in all relevant
respects except the state in which they are located. The
state is interfering, not in public vs. private competition,
but in public vs. public. As a formal matter, the taxes
should therefore be evaluated under Carbone, not United
Haulers.
One likely counter to that argument would be to posit
that in fact in-state municipal bonds ‘‘compete,’’ in some
sense, not only with out-of-state municipal bonds but
also with private bonds. We would agree that the state
tax exemption for in-state public bonds likely raises
slightly the cost of borrowing for private issuers. Ulti-
mately, however, all capital competes with all other
capital,58 so that if the concept of competition is to do any
work at all, there must be a dividing line that separates
constitutionally significant competition from all else. As a
practical matter, we think the municipal bond market is
sufficiently distinct from the taxable bond market that
competition between municipal and taxable bonds is not
constitutionally significant. For instance, the prevalence
of single-state bond funds, in defiance of the general
economic wisdom of diversification, illustrates the extent
to which purchasers of municipal bonds do so solely as a
result of their tax-exempt status.59
Even if that reply is not fully persuasive, it would still
remain the case that the municipal bond cases would not
be squarely within the holding of United Haulers. At
worst, the bond cases present a scenario in which the
challenged laws benefit an in-state public entity at the
expense of both private and public competitors. United
Haulers does not tell us how to decide whether ‘‘discrimi-
nation’’ encompasses comparisons between entities,
some but not all of whom are ‘‘substantially similar.’’60
One might also object that the public-private distinc-
tion was likely a purely rhetorical maneuver the Court
took to sidestep Carbone without formally overruling it
and that in the future Carbone will have no further
weight. We agree that is certainly a possibility, especially
because the municipality in Carbone for virtually all
intents and purposes was the owner of the (formally
privately owned) trash facility. We note, however, that
Chief Justice Roberts was unable to get a fifth vote for the
portion of his opinion, Part II.D., that arguably would
have overruled a portion of Carbone. We also note that
56Our readers, being tax experts, are no doubt aware of the
considerable fluidity of formal ‘‘ownership.’’ As the holder of a
$1 option to purchase a facility that cost $1.4 million to build, the
municipality that issued the ordinance invalidated in Carbone
was, in an economic sense, the owner of that facility (although
the municipality might have been shielded from downside risk
if the facility wound up to have a negative value on account of
environmental liabilities or the like).
57United Haulers, slip op. at 10 (quoting Gen’l Motors Corp. v.
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1998)). The result is not an obvious
implication of General Motors. In General Motors, the Court found
that a state tax credit for ‘‘natural gas companies’’ did not
‘‘discriminate,’’ despite the fact that only in-state utility compa-
nies currently qualified under that category. General Motors, 519
U.S. at 282-283, 298-304. The Court explained that the utilities
did not, as an economic matter, compete for the same customers
as the out-of-state natural gas providers. Id. at 300-302. It noted,
however, that there was a ‘‘possibility’’ of competition, and
suggested that if there had been any evidence of competition, it
would have faced a rather different question. Id. at 302-303; see
also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
562, 582 n.16 (1998). In contrast, the United Haulers Court
acknowledged that there was genuine economic competition for
trash hauling services between the counties’ facility and other
haulers. That was just the question seemingly left open by
General Motors.
58See Ferdinand P. Schoettle, ‘‘Big Bucks, Cloudy Thinking:
Constitutional Challenges to State Taxes — Illumination from
the GATT,’’ 19 Va. Tax Rev. 277, 353 (1999).
59See text accompanying note 11 supra.
60Similarly, although beyond our scope here, United Haulers
does not consider the appropriate level of scrutiny for laws
favoring both public and private in-state actors. If a state owns
a single apple tree, can it enact laws favoring all domestic apple
growers at the expense of all foreign orchards, and escape
‘‘rigorous’’ scrutiny? We suspect that whatever level of scrutiny
the Court purported to apply in such a case, it would take a very
skeptical view of the asserted in-state benefits. For now, how-
ever, our main point is that United Haulers leaves open those
questions, rather than — as some initial reactions have sug-
gested — resolving them.
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Justice Ginsburg, without explanation, joined the major-
ity in both Carbone and United Haulers. Because the
Chief’s United Haulers opinion recites many of the points
urged by Justice Souter’s Carbone dissent, we can only
assume that Justice Ginsburg has either changed her
mind or attaches some significance to the wholly formal
factual difference between the two cases.
There are at least two good reasons to distinguish
private-public competition from public-public competi-
tion. Both involve the relative weights courts should
assign to the competing values of free trade and local
government autonomy. In two key paragraphs at the
heart of the majority opinion, the United Haulers court
explains that ‘‘treating public and private entities the
same . . . would lead to unprecedented and unbounded
interference by the courts with state and local govern-
ment.’’61 There are instances, however, when the interests
underlying that respect for local government autonomy
are weakened, and therefore when we think the need to
preserve free trade might well swing to the fore. Our
suggestion is that United Haulers and Davis-type cases
implicate different underlying concerns.
First, we think state autonomy deserves little regard
when the state exercises it to discriminate in favor of its
own public entity at the expense of other, rival public
entities. A major component of the respect for state
autonomy in the Court’s dormant commerce clause juris-
prudence is the importance of the competition among
states, and between states and the federal government, to
attract capital, mobile citizenry, and political goodwill
and allegiance.62 That interstate competition for good
government replaces the market discipline that drives
competition among private firms, therefore ensuring that
local government will, like industry, strive to become
ever more efficient and effective, enhancing overall na-
tional welfare.63 If each state is free to shield itself from
the consequences of poor performance, that discipline
breaks down, undermining one of the key advantages
that a federated government was supposed to offer over
purely central authority.64 For instance, in the context of
general obligation bonds, discrimination against out-of-
state bonds allows a state to shield itself against competi-
tive pressure from jurisdictions whose better fiscal man-
agement has resulted in a superior bond rating.
Second, as we have explained, the United Haulers
Court presumed that laws favoring local government are
likely to serve ‘‘legitimate goals,’’ rather than mere pro-
tectionism. In the case of laws affecting public-public
competition, however, the inference that the law serves
some public good, other than entrenching the enacting
officials against outside competition, is rather weaker.
Therefore, again, the values of free trade should assume
a greater importance in the Court’s balancing — leading
either to ‘‘rigorous’’ scrutiny or perhaps a level of scru-
tiny somewhere between rigorous and what seemed to be
the highly forgiving standard the United Haulers plurality
applied in Part II.D of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion.
b. Where are the competitors? Another important
difference between United Haulers and in-state municipal
bond preferences is the identity of the competitors af-
fected by the preference. After concluding that public and
private trash haulers were not ‘‘substantially similar,’’ the
Court added that that ‘‘it bears mentioning that the most
palpable harm imposed by the ordinances — more
expensive trash removal — is likely to fall upon the very
people who voted for the laws.’’65 Those costs, it claimed,
would result in ‘‘political restraints’’ on any unfair bur-
dens on interstate competition.66 Further, in a footnote,
the Court responded to the possible danger of a future
‘‘Oneida-Herkimer Hamburger Stand’’ by observing that
‘‘the existence of major in-state interests adversely af-
fected by a law is a powerful safeguard against legislative
abuse.’’67 Similar political considerations have at times
played a deciding role in the Court’s commerce clause
jurisprudence, with West Lynn Creamery v. Healy a pri-
mary example.68
The Court’s assertion in United Haulers that the added
costs of trash removal are the ‘‘most palpable’’ harm of
the Oneida-Herkimer ordinance is dubious. The Oneida-
Herkimer ordinance imposes at most a small, difficult-
to-measure harm spread widely across the local political
community. The difficulty of discerning that harm and
the collective action problems inherent in mobilizing
against it are formidable (particularly when compared
with the concentrated harm done to out-of-state trash
processors and their owners).69
61United Haulers, slip op. at 11-12.
62See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, section
6-11, at 434 (2d ed. 1988); Dan T. Coenen, ‘‘Business Subsidies
and the Dormant Commerce Clause,’’ 107 Yale L.J. 965, 1033-
1034 (1998).
63For the genesis of this theory, see Charles M. Tiebout, ‘‘A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,’’ 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956).
Of course, this competition rationale is not without its critics.
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, ‘‘Our Localism, Part II — Localism
and Legal Theory,’’ 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 349-352, 415 (1990)
(arguing that there cannot be meaningful competition for good
government when competitors have vastly unequal resources).
64The Court has explicitly recognized intergovernmental
competition as a value to be protected under the dormant
commerce clause. See Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treas., 498
U.S. 358, 374 (1991); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
522 (1935).
65Slip op. at 13.
66Id. (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
767-778 n.2 (1945)).
67Id. at 13 n.7.
68512 U.S. 186 (1994), Doc 94-5761, 94 TNT 118-5; see also
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17;
Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978).
69See Drahozal, supra note 43, at 1154-1155; Daniel Shaviro,
‘‘An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation,’’ 90
Mich. L. Rev. 895, 931-932 (1992); Mark Tushnet, ‘‘Rethinking the
Dormant Commerce Clause,’’ 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 125, 132-133.
Theoretically, it would be quite rational for state residents to
accept some burdens as the price of exporting other costs to
other states. If the overall in-state pie is larger, those voters
suffering an added burden should expect to come out ahead in
the long run through logrolling. Thus, residents burdened by
discriminatory regulation might not mobilize even when they
could otherwise overcome the collective action problem dis-
cussed in the text. However, local actors are likely aware that the
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Contrast West Lynn Creamery, in which the Court
struck down a Massachusetts scheme pairing a uniform
milk tax with a subsidy for local milk providers. The
result, the court observed, was an increase in the price of
milk to the detriment of Massachusetts consumers. Yet
the Court focused on the political effects of the scheme
for milk dealers and dairy farmers, the groups who were
likely to be most aware of the scheme and most politi-
cally active in supporting or opposing it.70 The Court
observed that ‘‘consumers would be unlikely to organize
effectively to oppose the pricing order’’ because they
were unlikely to notice any price increase, and even if
they did, they wouldn’t attribute it to the challenged
regulation.71 Unless there is some important structural
difference between the markets for trash processing and
milk, the analysis by the Court in West Lynn Creamery is
difficult to square with the claim that Oneida and
Herkimer voters were ‘‘most palpabl[y]’’ harmed by the
flow control ordinance at issue in United Haulers.
To the extent politics informs dormant commerce
clause doctrine, we think the West Lynn Creamery analysis
is more convincing than the analysis in United Haulers.
Nearly every nonneutral tax or regulation potentially
harms consumers in the sense that it lowers the overall
efficiency of the market. Thus, if harms to in-state con-
sumers automatically ratcheted down the level of judicial
scrutiny, the dormant commerce clause would be ren-
dered toothless. Because this portion of the United Haul-
ers opinion so sharply conflicts with the more conceptu-
ally sound analysis in West Lynn Creamery and other
similar cases, we think its enduring significance will be
minimal.
But even if we are wrong in our assessment of the
significance of the portion of United Haulers focusing on
harm to consumers, we still think it is distinguishable
from the municipal bond scenario. In United Haulers, it
was difficult to tell a true cost-exporting story. The
monopoly diminished the efficiency of the interstate
market for trash-processing. But, factoring in harms to
local private processors, it isn’t clear whether the Oneida-
Herkimer monopoly actually transferred wealth from
outside those counties to inside the counties. It therefore
was somewhat more likely that consumers in Oneida and
Herkimer would object to what was in effect a user fee
for trash removal.72 In contrast, the disparate taxation of
municipal bonds straightforwardly enriches the taxing
state at the expense of sister states, which, by definition,
cannot be directly represented in the political process.73
And, unlike the out-of-state trash haulers in United
Haulers, who could rely on the efforts of local haulers,
out-of-state municipal bond issuers have no concen-
trated, similarly burdened in-state constituency to make
their case for them.
c. Other distinctions. Finally, we see two other pos-
sible differences between United Haulers and Davis, al-
though we think those last two are less likely to be
adopted by a court. First, United Haulers at points em-
phasizes the fact that trash hauling is a ‘‘traditional
government function,’’ and it is not a certainty that one
could say the same of bond financing.74 Second, one
might argue that United Haulers should be limited to
‘‘regulatory’’ cases and not applied at all to tax. But we
find any distinction between tax and regulation fairly
ephemeral.
The Court is not particularly clear on the role ‘‘tradi-
tion’’ plays in its analysis. It simply notes that it is
‘‘particularly hesitant to interfere’’ with typical and tra-
ditional government functions.75 Perhaps that’s another
way of saying either that roles the government has filled
before are less likely to be employed as a vehicle for
protectionism76 or that the balance between free trade
and local autonomy should tip slightly farther toward
autonomy to carry out ‘‘traditional’’ government func-
tions. The difficulty is that that factor, if given any real
weight, would seemingly cut into the role of state and
local governments as agents of innovation, experiment,
and competition. And, of course, as the dissent notes, the
Court has tried and failed before at defining ‘‘traditional’’
government activities.77 Therefore, that point strikes us as
a makeweight. At most, we think that it will likely go the
payoffs from logrolling may never come, either because the pie
doesn’t grow as planned or because the political understanding
by which the burdened in-staters are compensated doesn’t
translate into political action as conceived. Therefore, in a more
realistic picture of the political process, cost exporting may not
prevent local interests burdened by a regulation or tax from
opposing it, unless the payoff is very likely to arrive.
70Similarly, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, concurring in
Carbone, observed that a local government monopoly imposes
large, visible costs on local private would-be competitors and
that it therefore is plausible that those local interests will be able
to overcome their collective action problems. Carbone, 511 U.S. at
404-405 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981); Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978); Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675 (1981)). We think the point
also explains the significance of the United Haulers Court’s
reference to in-state interests as a check against the spectre of the
‘‘Oneida-Herkimer Hamburger Stand.’’
71West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 201 and n.18.
72As we have noted, however, we remain skeptical that those
objections could have translated to political success. See supra
note 69.
73We think the Court is likely to recognize the significance of
this distinction. Justice David Souter’s dissent in Carbone em-
phasized the possibility of harms to consumers as a check on the
town’s behavior. Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 425-427
(1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). He acknowledged, however, that
the argument would not be persuasive in the case of a cost-
exporting regulation. Id. at 425-426 and n.15.
74United Haulers, slip op. at 12-14 and n.7. We think that
question would be much more difficult in the case of so-called
section 529 plans. A section 529 plan is a tax-deferred invest-
ment vehicle for postsecondary education expenses, authorized
under section 529, and managed by and offered through indi-
vidual states. States generally grant deferral for funds invested
in plans they manage, but not for funds invested in other states’
plans.
75United Haulers, slip op. at 12.
76Cf. id. at 13-14 n.7 (relying on the ‘‘customary and tradi-
tional’’ nature of trash hauling as a government function to
distinguish it from other possible state-run commercial ven-
tures).
77United Haulers, slip op. at 14-15 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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way of ‘‘public use’’ in takings doctrine; a ‘‘traditional’’
government purpose will be whatever the public has
chosen fairly to do.78
As for the tax-regulatory distinction, we note that
while such a divide has a respectable doctrinal pedigree,
it makes almost no functional sense. The Court has
routinely distinguished between impermissible tax in-
centives and economically identical, but probably consti-
tutionally permissible, direct subsidies.79 Similarly, pre-
eminent commentators have described the Court’s
dormant commerce clause tax jurisprudence as largely
separate and distinct from its evaluation of broader
‘‘regulatory’’ statutes.80 Perhaps one might give some
substance to this formal difference by suggesting that
taxes are just about raising revenue and that therefore the
inference of protectionism is much stronger in the case of
discriminatory taxes.
While in theory it might therefore be argued that
United Haulers does not affect the meaning of ‘‘discrimi-
nation’’ under the Complete Auto Transit test (the gold
standard for commerce clause review of tax legislation),
we think that distinction cannot endure. We agree with
Prof. Edward Zelinsky that existing differences among
review of taxes, subsidies, and regulations are incoherent
and unstable.81 And we think the revenue-regulation
dichotomy is illusory. Even putting aside taxes, such as
sin taxes, whose explicit point is to change behavior, the
very act of choosing a tax base involves decisions about
how best to allocate the economic burden of the tax. Tax,
in other words, is inherently redistributive. We doubt the
Court would consider the choice of how best to allocate
redistributive burdens as anything other than a central
function of government to be protected carefully.
IV. Conclusion
United Haulers is an important decision, with many
interesting implications for the law of the dormant com-
merce clause. On balance, however, we think Davis is
distinguishable. The ordinance upheld in United Haulers
was subject to powerful political checks from concen-
trated local constituencies with a strong motive to oppose
the ordinance, checks simply not present when states
discriminate against bonds issued by other states. And,
while United Haulers lifts the presumption of unconstitu-
tionality from laws favoring state-run businesses in com-
petition with private business, it is doubtful that the
Court would turn such a favorable eye on laws shielding
state officials from the pressure of competition with rival
state-run enterprises. Therefore, we predict that, if con-
stitutional law remains as it stands, state laws exempting
only in-state tax-exempt bonds will be found to violate
the dormant commerce clause.
78See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478-483 (2005).
79See Hellerstein and Coenen, supra note 44, at 836-846.
80Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law, 274 (5th ed.
2005).
81Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘Restoring Politics to the Commerce
Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce
Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation,’’ 29 Ohio N.U.L.
Rev. 29, 30-32 (2002); Edward A. Zelinsky, ‘‘Are Tax ‘Benefits’
Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?’’ 112 Harv.
L. Rev. 379, 417, 421 (1998). However, we draw rather different
conclusions from that premise, as we hope to elaborate on at
greater length elsewhere.
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